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Abstract
This paper analyzes information reporting by a privately informed expert con-
cerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert’s rep-
utation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert
typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to
deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on the information
structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their in-
formation. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their
own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others.
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1. Introduction
In order to foster their career, experts typically seek favorable evaluations. For example,
consider an analyst consulted by an investor about the value of a stock. The investor
evaluates the accuracy of the analyst’s information by cross-checking the analyst’s report
with the realized profitability of the investment. Analysts who are believed to have ac-
cess to more accurate information are rewarded by the market. Similarly, managers and
business consultants with better reputation can charge more for their services. Company
directors and board members who are believed to be effective are more likely to be reap-
pointed or hired by other companies. Politicians considered to be better informed are more
likely to be re-elected, and so derive increased private benefits. The model of reputational
cheap talk developed in this paper can be applied to these and other situations in which
individuals are concerned about their reputation for being well informed.
Our model features an expert who observes a private signal (s) about a state of the
world (x). The amount of information contained in this signal depends on the expert’s
ability type (t). After observing the signal (and possibly the ability), the expert reports a
message (m) to an evaluator. The evaluator later observes the state and combines it with
the message to update the belief regarding the expert’s ability. This belief (or reputation)
determines the expert’s payoff, which the expert aims to maximize. This is a cheap talk
(or costless signalling) game, in which the expert (sender) does not bear a direct cost from
the message sent, but cares about the induced response of the evaluator (receiver).1 ,2
In the context of this model, we aim at addressing the following questions:
• When is the expert’s concern for ability compatible with truthful reporting?
• In which direction does the expert wish to bias the report, when believed to be
truthful?
• What reporting strategy should the expert be rationally expected to use in equilib-
rium?
• What is the effect of the expert’s knowledge about own ability?
• What happens in the presence of competition among experts?
1In the cheap-talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982), the receiver cannot commit to take any decision
other than the ex-post optimal one given the information communicated by the sender. In contrast, in the
case of delegation (Holmström, 1984) the receiver is able to commit ex-ante to a decision rule.
2See Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992), and Morris (2001) for models of reputation building
about preferences, rather than quality of information possessed. While those papers study dynamic games,
we look at the stage cheap talk game with exogenous reputational concerns.
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The main result of this paper is that with a generic continuous information structure,
the equilibrium cannot be fully revealing. Contrary to naive intuition, experts wishing to
be perceived as accurate do not truthfully reveal their private information. In any generic
model in which the ability parametrizes the signal’s informativeness about the state, the
information about the state is necessarily intertwined with that about ability. There are
then two incentives at play. On the one hand, the dependence of the signal on ability
gives an incentive to manipulate the signal’s report, but on the other hand this incentive
is mitigated by the signal’s dependence on the state.
To understand why truthtelling is typically incompatible with equilibrium, suppose that
the evaluator conjectures that the expert truthfully reveals the signal. Note that the ability
determines the relation between the signal and the state of the world. Then, some signal-
state observations made by the evaluator must result in favorable posterior reputation
about ability. In a putative fully separating equilibrium, the signal and the realized state
are informative about ability. This gives an incentive to the expert to manipulate the
report of the signal in order to generate a better reputation. The expert will then want to
pretend to possess the signal that gives rise to the highest expected reputational payoff, and
this is typically different from the signal actually observed. The expert’s incentive to lie
destroys any fully separating equilibrium in which the expert’s signal can be inferred from
the message reported. We prove that only degenerate specifications of the information
structure are so balanced that the true signal can be honestly reported in equilibrium
(Proposition 1).
This finding is reminiscent of Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) result in the canonical model
of partisan advice, but is driven by different forces. In their setting the impossibility of full
revelation follows immediately from the presence of conflict of interest between the sender
and the receiver. Instead, in our setting this impossibility crucially depends on the features
of the information structure.3 To illustrate this point, we showcase two somewhat degen-
erate information structures that permit truthtelling (Propositions 2 and 3). In order to
better understand the incentive to deviate from truthtelling, we also provide an analytical
characterization of its direction (Proposition 4). In our focal examples the deviation incen-
tive leads experts to bias their reports towards the a priori expected (Proposition 5). This
is because experts fear that extreme predictions are too likely to be seen as the product
of noisy, uninformative signals.
More generally, in equilibrium the message space is endogenously coarse. Experts who
3There are two key differences between partisan and professional advice. First, sender and receiver
have different objectives in the two models. Second, our receiver has access to an additional source of
information (the realized state) before taking the action (evaluation of the sender).
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desire to impress a rational audience are then unable to communicate all the informa-
tion they have. When experts with different information rank differently the evaluation
of ability following the various messages sent, it is possible for some information to be
communicated in equilibrium.4 In any case, a reported message pools many signals, and
is therefore less precise than the sender’s true signal.
Intuitively, the incentive to deviate from truthful revelation should depend on whether
the sender knows her own ability. The incentive to deviate towards what the receiver
expects to hear should be diminished when ability is privately known, because higher
ability experts tend to have more extreme beliefs. We clarify through some examples that
this intuition depends in a subtle way on whether the sender is expected to truthfully
report the signal or the posterior belief. If the evaluator expects truthful reporting of the
signal, the expert is still conservative, although less so the more able she is. If instead
the evaluator expects truthful reporting of the posterior mean of the expert’s posterior
belief, experts wish to exaggerate their beliefs (Proposition 6). Contrary to what happens
when the expert does not know her own ability, with known ability there exists always an
informative equilibrium in our examples (Proposition 7).
We also investigate the effect of competition among experts on their reporting incen-
tives. In a winner-take-all specification, experts might well have incentives to differentiate
their messages. Instead, we show that if the experts continue to have von Neumann-
Morgenstern payoffs and conditionally independent signals, a multi-expert setting is the
direct sum of equivalent single-expert settings (Proposition 8).
In the Bayesian statistics literature, Bayarri and DeGroot (1988) and (1989) were the
first to analyze the incentive to manipulate information reports in order to gain influence.
They posited that the weight given to an expert is proportional to an expert’s prior weight
and the predictive density that the expert had assigned to the realized outcome.5 In their
setting, experts maximize their own weight by reporting a predictive distribution different
from their posterior distribution. We depart from Bayarri and DeGroot in two important
ways. Firstly, rather than assuming an ad hoc updating rule for the weights, we follow
the lead of Holmström (1999) by positing that the evaluator makes optimal use of all
information available to form the posterior belief on the informativeness of the expert’s
signal.6 Secondly, we not only characterize the incentives to deviate from honest reporting,
4Similarly, Crawford and Sobel (1982) find that some communication is possible when the sender and
the decision maker have sufficiently congruent preferences.
5This happens naturally if a linear opinion pool is used (e.g., see Genest and Zidek, 1986).
6Section 3 of Holmström (1999) contains the first formulation of a reputational model where more able
managers have access to a more precise signal about an investment opportunity. For a general analysis
of the moral hazard problem presented instead in the first part of Holmström’s paper see Dewatripont,
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but we also study the equilibrium of the game.
Our work builds more directly on the single-agent model of Scharfstein and Stein
(1990).7 In their model signals, states, and ability types are binary and the signals of
better informed experts are conditionally more correlated. They observed that the second
of two agents could not communicate honestly, but they attributed this finding mainly to
the assumption of differential conditional correlation. Here, we consider instead experts
with conditionally independent signals and discover that honesty is impossible under very
general conditions.8
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model for the baseline case of
an expert who does not know her own ability. Section 3 shows the generic impossibility of
truthful revelation. Section 4 investigates the deviation incentives. Section 5 discusses the
equilibrium predictions of the model. Section 6 considers the case of known ability. Sec-
tion 7 extends the model to the case with multiple experts who care about the perception
about their relative ability. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. Model
We consider a communication game played by an expert (sender) and an evaluator (re-
ceiver) with the following timing. First, the expert receives a signal realization that
depends on state and ability. Second, the expert sends a message to the evaluator. Third,
the evaluator observes the state and updates the belief about the expert’s ability. We now
explain in more detail the information structure and the payoffs of the players.
An expert of ability type t ∈ T ⊆ R privately receives an informative signal s ∈ S on
the state of the world x ∈ X with conditional probability density function (p.d.f.) f(s|x, t).
The ability parametrizes the informativeness of the expert’s signal. State and ability are
assumed to be statistically independent, with common non-degenerate prior beliefs q (x)
on state and p (t) on ability. Until Section 6, we assume that the expert does not know
her own ability type t. After observation of the non-provable signal s, the expert decides
which message m ∈ M to send. As explained below in more detail, the message space is
arbitrarily rich and determined only as part of an equilibrium. A strategy of the expert is
a mapping from signals into messages. The conditional probability thatm is sent following
signal s is denoted by ϕ(m|s). When representing a pure strategy, the message sent after
Jewitt, and Tirole (1999).
7Departing from Holmström (1999), they assumed that the state of the world is eventually realized
regardless of the report. We also assume that the sender’s report does not affect the state or what the
receiver can observe about it.
8See also the discussion in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000).
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receiving signal s is denoted by m(s).
The evaluator observes the message sent by the expert as well as the eventual real-
ization of the state x. The evaluator’s job is to compute the posterior reputation of the
sender p (t|m,x).9 ,10 To do so, the evaluator forms a conjecture ϕˆ on the strategy used
by the sender. Given the conjecture, the evaluator computes the chances fˆ (m|x, t) =R
S ϕˆ(m|s)f(s|x, t) ds and fˆ(m|x) =
R
T fˆ(m|x, t)p(t) dt. The posterior reputation is then
calculated according to Bayes’ rule to be p (t|m,x) = p (t) fˆ (m|x, t) /fˆ(m|x).11
Regardless of the privately observed signal, the expert wishes to induce the evaluator’s
most favorable beliefs p(t|m,x).12 The expert’s preferences over posterior reputations are
represented by the strictly increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function v(t).13





The preference ordering over reputation for expertise is therefore common across types.
When sending the message, the sender does not know the state that the evaluator will
observe and use to update the sender’s reputation.14 The expected reputational payoff for




W (m|x)q(x|s) dx, (2.2)
where the expert’s posterior belief on the state x conditional on receiving signal s is
given by Bayes’ rule as q (x|s) = f(s|x)q(x)/f (s), with f (s|x) = RT f(s|x, t)p (t) dt and
9We may think of the evaluator as being rewarded for predicting as accurately as possible the ability
t of the expert based on all the information (m,x) available. It is implicitly assumed that the evaluator
is sequentially rational.
10In Brandenburger and Polak’s (1996) model, the stock market performs a similar role of evaluation,
but assesses the investment’s profitability, rather than the quality of the expert’s information. In addition,
in their model the market observes the message sent by the expert, but not the state realization.
11Zitzewitz (2001) proposes an alternative model in which the market evaluates the quality of the
information contained in the forecast with a simple econometric technique, rather than via Bayesian
updating.
12The payoff to the sender depends entirely on the receiver’s belief and may be intangible. The payoff
is tangible if it derives from the value of the services provided in a future second and last period by the
expert, as in Holmström (1999). Truthful revelation is an equilibrium in this second period.
13This is a psychological game in which the sender’s payoff depends on the belief of the receiver. In
line with Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989), we assume that payoffs have an expected utility
formulation. A similar approach has been followed by Bernheim (1995) to measure people’s preference for
esteem.
14As first noticed by Seidmann (1990) in cheap-talk games with inter-type agreement, information can
nevertheless be transmitted in equilibrium provided that the receiver’s decision is based on some additional




X f(s|x)q (x) dx.15 Messages then correspond to lotteries over posterior reputa-
tions, with payoff corresponding to state realizations. Depending on the evaluator’s rule
for calculating the posterior reputation, different messages may induce lotteries that are
differently appealing to experts with different signals.
An expert strategy ϕ constitutes a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game if for
almost all s ∈ S, m solves maxm0∈M V (m0|s) for ϕ (·|s)-almost all m ∈M , where the value
function is computed as just described from the correct conjecture ϕˆ = ϕ. Our equilibrium
analysis focuses on the sender’s optimal choice among messages sent on the equilibrium
path.16
Throughout the paper we will illustrate our results with examples belonging to either
of the following two classes of information structures: (1) Linear Experiment and (2)
Location Experiment.
Example 1: Linear experiment. In this class of examples, the generalized probability
density function of the signal conditional on state x and ability t is linear in t ∈ T ⊆ [0, 1],
f(s|x, t) = tg(s|x) + (1− t)h(s). (2.3)
A signal generated from this experiment can be interpreted as a mixture between an
informative and an uninformative experiment.17 Better experts are more likely to receive
a signal drawn from the informative g(s|x) rather than the uninformative h(s). In fact,
a more talented expert receives better information in the sense of Blackwell. To see this,
consider the garbling of s into es whereby es = s with probability τ < 1, and otherwise es is
independently redrawn from h(s). Then ef(es|x, t) = τf(es|x, t) + (1 − τ)h(es) = f(es|x, τt),
so that the garbled signal to an expert of ability t > 0 is distributed as the signal to an
expert of ability τt < t.
In the paper we make repeated use of three special cases of the linear experiment:
(1A) Binary Experiment, (1B) Dichotomous Experiment, and (1C) Multiplicative Linear
Experiment.
15This linearity property of the reputational payoff is satisfied in the first of a two-period model, provided
that information about ability has no value in the second period. We refer to Li (2004) for an analysis of
a reputational cheap talk game in which this linearity property is violated.
16It is assumed that any off-path message is interpreted by the receiver as equivalent to some particular
on-path message. Since the number of equilibria is typically small, we do not consider belief refinements.
17Note the similarity with Green and Stokey’s (1980) success-enhancing model. In the success-enhancing
model the experiment fails with positive probability, in which case the signal is uninformative about the
state. In our linear model instead, the experimenter only knows the probability that the experiment is
contaminated.
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Example 2: Location experiment. We consider continuous symmetric location exper-
iments with conditional p.d.f. f (s|x, t) = g (|s− x| |t), where S = X is a normed space,
T = R, and g satisfies the following two assumptions: (i) Unimodality: g (ε|t) is a decreas-
ing function of ε, and (ii) Monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP): g (ε|t) /g (ε|t0) is
strictly decreasing in ε when t0 < t. The latter condition means that a signal realization
s closer to x is better news for t. It is simple to see that f has these symmetry and uni-
modality properties (around x): f (s|x, t) depends on s and x only through |s− x|, and
it is a decreasing function of |s− x|. Clearly, f (s|x) = g (|s− x|) = RT g(|s− x| |t)p (t) dt
inherits these same properties for any prior p (t). In the interesting special case where
g (ε|t) = g˜ (ε/t) /t for some fixed p.d.f. g˜ defined on the positive real axis, Lehmann (1988)
showed (without assuming symmetry) that the informativeness of the experiment is in-
creasing in the precision t, with respect to monotone decision problems.
Below, we will focus on three special cases: (2A) Uniform Location Experiment, (2B)
Location Experiment with Prior Information, and (2C) Normal Experiment.
3. Generic impossibility of truthtelling
In order to place our contribution, we begin by revisiting known results for the simplest
example of reputational cheap talk with two signals.
Example 1A: Binary experiment. This very simple linear experiment features two
signals S = {−1, 1}, two states X = {−1, 1}, two ability types T = {tb, tg} ⊆ [0, 1]
with tb < tg, and distributions h (s) = 1/2 and g (s|x) = (1 + sx) /2, so that f(1|1, t) =
Pr(1|1, t) = (1 + t) /2 = Pr(−1| − 1, t) = f(−1| − 1, t). Denote the expected ability
Et = p (tg) tg+p (tb) tb. This example allows us to gain some initial intuition and introduce
the general themes presented in the paper.18
In a pooling (also known as babbling or uninformative) equilibrium the sender of both
types s = 1 and s0 = −1 adopt the same strategy, ϕ (m|1) = ϕ (m|− 1) for all messagesm.
Given the receiver’s correct conjecture of this strategy, fˆ (m|x, t) = ϕˆ (m|s) = ϕˆ (m|s0) is
independent of (x, t). This implies that the receiver cannot draw any meaningful inference,
so that p(tg|m,x) = p (tg) for any (m,x). But then the sender is indifferent among all
messages. Note that such a pooling equilibrium always exists.
In a separating (also known as truthtelling, fully revealing or informative) equilibrium
the expert sends a different message depending on the signal received, so that m (s) = s
18This information structure has been used by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) in the first formulation of
reputational cheap talk and further analyzed by Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) in Lemma 1.
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once the message is identified with its meaning. The posterior on ability then satisfies
p(tg|m,x = m) > p (tg) > p(tg|m,x 6= m), so that the reputation is updated favorably
when the expert is right, and unfavorably when wrong. Since v (t) is increasing and
there are two ability types, the sender’s objective is to maximize the probability of being
perceived to be of type tg. For truthtelling to be an equilibrium, it must be that the expert
with signal s prefers to send m = s rather than m0 = s0 6= s:
q (1|s) p(tg|s, 1) + q (−1|s) p(tg|s,−1) ≥ q (1|s) p(tg|s0, 1) + q (−1|s) p(tg|s0,−1) (3.1)
for s, s0 ∈ {−1, 1}. By Bayes’ rule, these two truthtelling constraints are equivalent to
(1−Et) /2 ≤ q (1) ≤ (1 +Et) /2. The truthtelling constraint for the low signal s = −1 is
violated if the prior belief is biased enough in favor of the high state, q (1) > (1 +Et) /2.
This is because in this case the expert maximizes the chance of being right by pretending
to possess a high signal. More generally, there is an incentive to deviate from a putative
separating equilibrium when the prior on the state is biased enough in either direction.
This simple binary example shows that the expert’s reputational concern can be either
fully compatible or completely incompatible with truthful information revelation. If the
prior on the state is intermediate, truthtelling can be sustained in equilibrium. If instead
the prior on the state is extreme, no information can be credibly transmitted.
As shown below, full revelation is an artifact of the discrete signal structure, and
holds because in a discrete setting the incentive compatibility constraints required for
pure strategy equilibrium hold with some slack. Turning to a more natural continuous
setting, we show that under reasonable conditions on the information structure there are
incentives to deviate at the margin from truthful reporting.
We begin by checking whether it is possible to sustain truthtelling in equilibrium. In
this cheap talk environment, the sender’s incentives are driven by the receiver’s under-
standing of the meaning of the messages sent, regardless of the language used. For the
purpose of checking the possibility of full revelation, it is therefore without loss of generality
to restrict the sender to send truthful signals.
By definition, truthful information transmission occurs when M = S and the message
sent equals the signal received, so that ϕ (s|s) = 1 or, equivalently, m(s) = s. Assume
for the moment that the receiver naively believes that the sender is applying this truthful
strategy, so that fˆ (m|x, t) = f (m|x, t). Is truthtelling then the optimal strategy for the
sender? If so, truthtelling is an equilibrium. We now show that equilibrium truthtelling
is impossible under natural informational assumptions with generic choices of the prior
belief and utility function, as also independently observed by Campbell (1998) in a more
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special case. By ruling out the existence of a truthtelling equilibrium, we conclude that
our cheap talk game cannot have any fully revealing equilibrium.
We say that local truthtelling in the open ball B ⊂ S is possible, if when the re-
ceiver anticipates local truthtelling (fˆ (m|x, t) = f (m|x, t) for all m ∈ B) then V (s|s) =
maxm∈B V (m|s) for all s ∈ B. In words, there is a whole ball where truthtelling by the
sender is a best response to the receiver’s anticipation of this. Local truthtelling immedi-
ately implies the first order condition
Vm (s|s) = 0 (3.2)
for all s ∈ B.
The experiment is defined to be locally uninformative about ability in the open ball
B ⊂ S if there exist functions K (t) and κ (s|x) such that f (s|x, t) = K (t)κ (s|x) for
almost all s ∈ B, almost all x ∈ X, and almost all t ∈ T . This states that the conditional
p.d.f. is separable in the observable outcome (s, x) and the unobservable ability t about
which inference is made. The condition implies that the evaluator cannot use the pair
(s, x) to make any discriminatory inference on t. Namely, for any two pairs (s, x) and
(s0, x0) with s, s0 ∈ B we have p (t|s, x) = p (t|s0, x0).
Since the ability type t parameterizes the relation between s and x, local uninforma-
tiveness is a degenerate property that violates the spirit of our model. Local uninforma-
tiveness immediately permits local truthtelling, since the posterior reputation is entirely
independent of the message sent. The following converse result is of far greater interest.
Proposition 1 (No truthtelling). Assume that S is a closed, convex subset of RJ , and
that X is a closed subset of RL. Assume that f(s|x, t) is bounded and twice continuously
differentiable in s, with f and fs jointly continuous in (x, t) and that the signal structure
is not locally uninformative in the open ball B ⊂ S. Local truthtelling in B is then
impossible for an open and dense set of prior beliefs q (x) and utility functions v(t).
To understand this result note that if the signal is not locally uninformative, different
message and state pairs (m,x) imply different posterior reputations p (t|m,x). Perturbing
the utility function v(t) if necessary, we guarantee that different posterior reputations yield
different reputational payoffs W (m|x). The sender is uncertain about the location of x,
but perturbations of the prior q(x) finally guarantee that Vm (s|s) varies with s.
Intuitively, the signal s contains information about t, and the expert has an incentive to
misrepresent the true s in order to give the most favorable impression. Proposition 1 shows
that this incentive is generically embedded in the model. The dependence of the signal on
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ability generates an incentive to manipulate the report, but this is partly mitigated by the
fact that the evaluator cross-checks the report with the realized state.
As shown above, the expert cannot completely reveal a signal s that carries information
about ability t. But a signal may in some dimensions carry information solely about the
state x, as when the multi-dimensional signal is s = (s1, s2) ∈ RJ1 × RJ2 and the signal
p.d.f. can be written as f (s|x, t) = f1 (s1|x) f2 (s2|x, t). In this case, it is easy to see that
there is an equilibrium in which s1 is reported truthfully but no information about s2 is
transmitted, so that the reputation is never updated and the sender is indifferent over all
the equilibrium messages. However, since s2 contains information about (x, t) there might
also be an equilibrium where messages about s2 are (imperfectly) informative. But since
the report of s1 results in a change in the prior belief on s2 and so on the information
about s2 transmitted, truthful reporting of s1 disappears. The joint formulation f (s|x, t)
is therefore most suitable for a complete analysis of the model.
The truthtelling condition (3.2) also suggests how to use explicit monetary incen-
tives to reinstate truthtelling. If the message sent were verifiable and explicit incentives
were allowed, truthtelling could be obtained by offering the reward schedule R (m) =R m
−∞ Vm (m˜|m˜) dm˜ to the expert. Correspondingly, the ex-ante cost of implementing
truthtelling would be
R
S R (s) f (s) ds. Notice that the cost could be lower if the reward
were allowed to depend also on the realization of the state. For the rest of this paper we
exclude the possibility of monetary incentives.
Truthtelling is an equilibrium in two very special situations, when the private signal is
infinitely more informative about the location of the state (dichotomous experiment) or
there is no public information (uniform location experiment).
Example 1B: Dichotomous experiment. In this specification of the linear experi-
ment, the prior on the state q(x) is atomless and the signal is drawn from f(s|x, t) =
tδx(s)+(1− t)h (s), where δx(s) is the Dirac delta function and h(s) is atomless, T = [0, 1]
and X = S ⊆ RJ . The expert receives perfect information (s = x) with probability t, and
otherwise receives an uninformative draw from an atomless distribution.
With this information structure, conditional on signal s, the posterior belief on the
state has an atom at x = s and a continuous density over all other states. Moreover, the
evaluator that receives m = x concludes that the signal was derived from the perfectly
informative distribution rather than the uninformative one, and that this is good news
about the type. Conversely, m 6= x is bad news. Thus, truthful reporting of the signal
m(s) = s constitutes an equilibrium, since any other signal has probability zero of turning
out to be correct.
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Proposition 2 (Truthtelling in dichotomous experiment). Truthtelling is an equi-
librium in the dichotomous experiment.
Clearly, truthtelling is an equilibrium in the degenerate case with a perfectly infor-
mative signal. More generally, truthtelling results when a signal indicates that a state is
infinitely more likely than all the other ones.
Example 2A: Uniform location experiment. In this specification of the location
experiment, there is no prior information on the state. In order to have a proper uniform
prior in this location model, the space X should be compact, and complete symmetry is
then most easily defined on a symmetric set. We assume that the spaces X and S are both
the unit circle, corresponding to the circumference of the unit ball in R2. A real number
z indicates a point on the circle in the usual way, giving the anti-clockwise distance along
the circumference from (1, 0), the circle’s origin in the plane.19
Due to the absence of any prior information about the state, there is no incentive to
deviate from truthtelling.
Proposition 3 (Truthtelling in uniform location experiment). Truthtelling is an
equilibrium in the uniform location experiment.
This result crucially depends on the uniform prior on the state. Truthfully reporting
m = s is then equivalent to reporting the mode of the symmetric posterior distribution
q (x|s). Since a signal s closer to the state x indicates a higher ability t by the MLRP
and the state is concentrated around s, it is advantageous for the sender to send m = s
when the receiver interprets m as s. Truthtelling would instead be incompatible with
equilibrium for any location experiment with a (generic) proper prior belief on the state.
4. Optimal deviation from truthtelling
As we have seen in the previous section, the incentives to deviate destroy any fully revealing
cheap talk equilibrium. In our reputational cheap talk we have derived endogenously
the incentive to deviate from truthtelling, depending on the exogenously specified signal
structure and value function. In Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) model of partisan cheap talk,
the incentive to deviate from truthtelling was instead assumed directly as a discrepancy
between the sender’s and receiver’s optimal actions.20
19For instance, the numbers −2π, 0, 2π all indicate (1, 0), while π/2 indicates (0, 1) in the plane.
20For instance, in their Lemma 1 they assume that the ideal actions of the sender and the receiver are
different for any given state.
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In our reputational model, there is no set direction in which the expert wishes to de-
viate. In this section, we characterize how this direction depends on the primitives of the
model. This characterization is important for at least three reasons. First, understanding
the pressure to deviate from honesty provides intuition for the impossibility of truthtelling
and sheds light on out-of-equilibrium forces. Second, these deviation incentives can explain
real-world outcomes of communication, that result when the evaluator is not fully ratio-
nal.21 Third, these incentives persist in the signalling equilibrium that results when the
decision making power is at least partially allocated to the expert.22
Expanding the first order condition (3.2), we now characterize in more detail the forces
that drive the sender to bias the report, when honesty is expected.23
Proposition 4 (Deviation incentives). Assume that S is a convex subset of RJ , and
that f (s|t, x) is differentiable. If the receiver conjectures truthtelling m (s) = s, the
marginal incentive to deviate is















Notice that the expectation is taken over the pair (x, t). The expert is tempted to
increase mj at the margin if this systematically affects the receiver’s posterior likelihood
ratios in the direction of greater weight on higher ability. The higher this covariance,
the stronger the incentive to deviate. It is naturally in the sender’s interest to convey
the impression that the signal s has a larger ratio f (s|t, x) /f (s|x) for higher values of
t, because this indicates to the receiver that the sender is likely to be of high ability.
Precisely, a local deviation is desirable when it marginally increases the covariance of
d log (f (s|t, x) /f (s|x)) /dmj with the increasing function v (t).24
In the following two examples the direction of the optimal deviation from truthtelling
can be easily derived.
21Indeed, existing experimental evidence on simpler cheap talk games of partisan advice confirms that
the deviation incentives influence the outcome even when the players have substantial experience with the
game (cf. Cai and Wang, 2003).
22This is the case in Prendergast and Stole’s (1996) reputational signalling model, in which the expert’s
payoff depends directly on the message sent (because of delegation), as well as indirectly through the effect
on the updated reputation. This difference explains why their equilibrium is fully-revealing, while ours is
coarse.
23This covariance characterization is similar to the one obtained by Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole’s
(1999) in Proposition 2.1 for a general version of Holmström’s (1999) career concern problem with hidden
action. In our hidden information context without commitment instead, this characterization relates to
deviation rather than equilibrium incentives.
24The value function v (t) is a strictly increasing transformation of t, so a simple change of variables in
the statistical model (from t to v) here allows us to assume without loss of generality that v (t) = t.
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Example 1C: Multiplicative linear experiment. This experiment generalizes the
binary experiment to a continuous setting, with S = X = [−1, 1], T = [0, 1], h (s) = 1/2
and g (s|x) = (1 + sx) /2 so that f (s|x, t) = (1 + sxt) /2.
Plugging the expression of the signal density into equation (4.1) we obtain
Vm (s|s) = [Cov [v (t) , t] /2f (s)]
Z 1
−1
xq (x) / (1 + sxEt) dx.
Ignoring the positive leading constant Cov [v (t) , t] /2f (s), the optimal deviation direction
at s is seen to be determined by the expectation of x/ (1 + sxEt). This expectation is
decreasing in s, so if it equals zero at some signal, for all other signals there is an incentive
to deviate in the direction of that signal. In the special case with prior q symmetric around
state x = 0, we have Vm (0|0) = 0, so that the bias is towards the ex ante expected state.
When instead the prior belief is strongly biased in either direction, Ottaviani and Sørensen
(forthcoming) have shown that there is an incentive to deviate in that same direction for
all signals, again reflecting a bias towards the expected.
Example 2B: Location experiment with prior information. In this example, the
signal is drawn from a location model where S = X = R, and a priori x has a strictly
quasi-concave distribution, symmetric around the prior location µ. Thus q (x) = h (|x− µ|)
where h is a strictly decreasing function.
The expert always exhibits a bias towards the ex ante expected state µ:25
Proposition 5 (Conservative bias in location experiment). In the location experi-
ment with prior information, there is a conservative deviation incentive: Vm (s|s) > 0 when
s < µ and Vm (s|s) < 0 when s > µ.
5. Equilibrium predictions
In the following examples, equilibria have a partition structure.
Example 1A (continued). When q (1) ∈ [(1−Et) /2, (1 +Et) /2], the two truthtelling
constraints (3.1) for s, s0 ∈ {−1, 1} are satisfied, so that there is a separating equilibrium.
Under this condition, one can also construct a hybrid mixed-strategy equilibrium, featuring
elements of both separating and pooling. For 1/2 ≤ q ≤ (1 +Et) /2 the expert with signal
25Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003) use a special case of this model where the prior q (x) and the sender’s
posterior q (x|s) are both normal. They establish (Proposition 3) that it is optimal to deviate from truthful
reporting of s to pretending that the signal is s˜ = E [x|s].
14
s = 1 sends message m = 1, while the expert with signal s = −1 sends the low message
with probability ϕ (m = −1|s = −1) = (2q − 1)/(q − (1−Et) /2) ∈ [0, 1] and the high
message m = 1 with complementary probability. The message thus garbles the signal. By
symmetry, for (1−Et) /2 ≤ q ≤ 1/2 there is a hybrid equilibrium with a similar structure.
In conclusion, for q (1) ∈ [(1−Et) /2, (1 +Et) /2] there are three equilibria: separating,
pooling, and hybrid; while for q /∈ [(1−Et) /2, (1 +Et) /2] the only equilibrium outcome
is pooling. Nevertheless, in this example the most informative equilibrium is unique.
Example 1C (continued). Consider a special version of the multiplicative linear exper-
iment with two states X = {−1, 1} showcased by Ottaviani and Sørensen (forthcoming).
When the prior q (1) is close enough to 1/2 there are two informative binary equilibria,
and the posterior belief of the indifferent type is necessarily more extreme than the prior
belief. This means that there is a region of types of sender with a posterior belief between
1/2 and q who nevertheless report an inclination towards the ex ante unlikely state. In
this sense, there is contrarian behavior in this model. In addition, notice that even in this
simple example there is no unique most informative equilibrium. If the prior q (1) is far
enough from 1/2, the expert always wishes to bias her report in the same direction and is
then unable to communicate any information in equilibrium.
Example 2B (continued). In the symmetric location experiment with Normal prior
x ∼ N (µ, 1/ν), Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003) have verified that there always exists a
two-message equilibrium of the following kind. The sender reports whether the signal is
above or below the prior mean µ. When observing a signal s > µ, the sender expects high
values of the state to be realized which are more likely to result in favorable reputational
updating when the sender is believed to have received signal above rather than below the
prior mean. This is then an equilibrium, since by symmetry the sender with s = µ is
indifferent among these two messages.
For the application of this model to the predictions of professional experts, we need
to discuss how information is communicated. In equilibrium, the receiver understands
that signals are garbled into the sender’s message m. The advice given by the expert is
typically used by a decision maker, whose beliefs f(x|m) are unambiguously determined in
equilibrium. The model predicts that in equilibrium the resulting belief f(x|m) is unbiased,
being derived from Bayesian updating, but is less informative than the expert’s private
belief f(x|s) in the sense of Blackwell.
In the rest of this section, we discuss three difficulties encountered when attempting to
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test directly this equilibrium prediction. The first difficulty is that equilibrium beliefs are
often unobservable. Nevertheless, in a number of settings, such as forecasting, the sender’s
reports are observable. It is then natural to use these reports for the purpose of testing
the theory.
When using the sender’s reports, the empirical comparison of the experts’ literal state-
ments with the outcome of the predicted variable x is impossible. This is because the
language used to send equilibrium messages is indeterminate, as in any cheap talk game.
To overcome this second difficulty, it is therefore necessary to make an assumption about
the language used in equilibrium. The natural language in this setting dictates that the
expert communicates the equilibrium posterior belief on the state (or its mean E[x|m]) or
recommends the corresponding optimal action conditional on that belief. If so, the mes-
sage m is translated into the best predictor on the state incorporating all its informational
content. Statements in this language can be easily compared with the realized state. The
empirically observed report would be more inaccurate than the conditional expectation
obtained from the expert’s signal.26
A direct test of our theory would then be based on the regression
x = α0 + α1m+ α2y + α3s+ ε, (5.1)
where x is the realized state, m the report, y any publicly known variable, s the private
information of the expert, and ε the error term. Unbiasedness requires that, when y and
s are excluded, the remaining coefficients are restricted to α0 = 0 and α1 = 1. Efficiency
requires that all information available to the expert has no additional predictive power in
the regression, i.e. α2 = α3 = 0. Identifying m with the prediction on the state E [x|m, y],
our reputational cheap talk model predicts unbiasedness and efficiency only with respect
to public information α2 = 0. According to our coarseness result, the message sent is not
a sufficient statistic for the expert’s private information. Furthermore, it is easy to show
that the MLRP of s, x implies the MLRP of s, x conditional on any realization m, when s
is a Blackwell sufficient experiment for m (cf. Ottaviani and Prat, 2001). Thus our model
predicts that α3 > 0. Direct test of this prediction would require access to the expert’s
private information, but this is rarely available. This is the third difficulty encountered
when using this direct testing strategy.
This difficulty has led empiricists to test for the orthogonality property of reports,
i.e. the fact that the report is uncorrelated with its error. In the case of forecasting,
orthogonality is tested by regressing the realized forecast error on the forecasts. For further
26In case many identical experts are polled simultaneously, their reports should be concentrated on a
finite set of positions. See also Section 5.
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discussion of the predictions of the theory when applied to strategic forecasting we refer
to Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003), where we compare the predictions of the reputational
cheap talk theory to those of the forecasting contest theory and extend both theories in a
number of directions relevant for empirical testing.
The equilibrium loss of information typically results in a welfare loss for the current
decision maker. In addition, future employers of the expert will have less information
about the expert’s true ability. Future decision makers would prefer the signal not to be
garbled if they value information about the expert’s ability.27 If the utility function v(t)
is linear, the sender’s ex ante expected reputational value of sending any message profile
is equal to its prior value. Therefore, the expert is indifferent in ex-ante terms between
the different equilibria. In expectation, no one benefits from the fact that information
transmitted in equilibrium is less precise than the information possessed by the expert.
6. Known ability
Up to now we have assumed that the expert has no superior information about ability
compared to the evaluator. In some situations experts have acquired such information
from previous experience. We now investigate the robustness of our findings to cases in
which the expert observes signal and ability (s, t) before reporting to the evaluator, as first
considered by Trueman (1994).28
6.1. Model extension
An expert of ability t who receives signal s has posterior on the state
q (x|s, t) = f (s|x, t)
f (s|t) q (x) . (6.1)
The evaluator’s conjecture of the sender’s strategy is now denoted by ϕˆ(m|s, t). The
posterior reputation is p(t|m,x) = fˆ(m|x, t)p(t)/fˆ(m|x), where the conditional chance of
messagem computed by the evaluator is fˆ(m|x, t) = RS ϕˆ(m|s, t)f(s|x, t) ds. The expected
reputational payoff of message m for a sender with signal s and ability t is assumed to be





v(t0)p(t0|m,x) dt0q (x|s, t) dx, (6.2)
27Information about the quality of information received can enable future employers to make better
decisions. This information is also valuable in some dynamic settings with competition. For example,
Prat (2003) develops two simple two-period settings in which future employers necessarily benefit from
information about ability.
28See also Avery and Chevalier (1999) and Levy (2004).
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for a strictly increasing utility function v(t).29
We begin by revisiting the binary model with known ability.
Example 1A (continued). Suppose that the receiver continues to conjecture that the
expert truthfully reveals the signal. The resulting reputation is calculated as before, and
therefore still has p (t|− 1,−1) = p (t|1, 1) > p (t|− 1, 1) = p (t|1,−1). When q (1) >
(1 + t) /2, the expert believes state x = 1 to be the more likely outcome and so wishes to
deviate from honest reporting of s = −1. The conservative bias is thus preserved from the
case of unknown ability, although more able experts have less incentive to deviate.
In the range q (1) ∈ [(1 + tb) /2, (1 + tg) /2], a natural conjecture of the receiver is that
the expert reports the most likely state. This means that the high type sends a message
m = s, while the low type always plays m = 1. But then message m = −1 reveals that
the expert is of the high type, and it therefore dominates message m = 1. Observe that
this deviation incentive is now opposite to the one resulting with unknown ability.
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) establish in Lemma 4 that the most informative equi-
librium involves two messages with the following properties. For q (1) ∈ [1/2, (1 + tb) /2],
there is pooling on the ability dimension but separation on the signal dimension, while
for q (1) ∈ [(1 + tb) /2, 1] both high and low ability experts with s = 1 send the positive
message m = 1, the high ability sender with s = −1 always sends the negative message
m = −1, but the low ability sender with s = −1 strictly randomizes between the pos-
itive and negative message. This equilibrium strikes a balance between the two natural
conjectures that we considered above. Notice that when q (1) > (1 + tg) /2, any expert
who reports m = −1 is not conservative, but is in fact adopting a position that is biased
away from the most likely state. On the other hand, the low-ability expert with s = −1 is
driven by the conservatism incentive to sometimes report m = 1.
6.2. Impossibility of truthtelling
It is immediate to see that there cannot be a fully revealing equilibrium whereby both the
signal realization s and the ability type t are communicated truthfully, m (s, t) = (s, t).
Otherwise, each expert would want to claim to have the highest possible ability type.
Therefore, there must be some form of pooling in the two-dimensional type space S × T .
Clearly, truthful reporting of ability and pooling on the signal, m (s, t) = t, is incompatible
with equilibrium.
29This is a strong assumption in this setting, because an expert with private information about her own
ability knows better than the market how her reputation will be updated in later periods. In a fully-fledged
dynamic model, an expert’s prospects of future earnings would then depend on ability.
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Consider next the strategy of truthfully reporting the signal m (s, t) = s and pooling
on the type. By extending Proposition 1, it can be shown that if the adviser knows her
own ability there is no equilibrium with truthful revelation of the signal for an open and
dense set of priors q (x) and utility functions v(t).
Examples 1B and 2A (continued). In the dichotomous and uniform location exper-
iments with known ability, it can be shown that there is an equilibrium with truthful
revelation of the signal under the assumptions of Proposition 2 and 3 respectively.
6.3. Deviation from truthful revelation of signal
The marginal incentive to deviate from truthful revelation of the signal can be expressed
in the style of Proposition 4 as
Vm(s|s, t) = E
·
v (t0)
















Again, the expectation is taken over the pair (x, t0), where t0 represents the variable over
which the receiver’s beliefs are defined. Equation (6.3) is similar to (4.1), only complicated
by the presence of a third factor that reflects the sender’s desire to bias the reported signal
in a direction associated with x values deemed likely given t.
We now verify that the bias towards the expected is robust in the multiplicative linear
experiment and the location experiment with a unimodal prior.
Example 1C (continued). Using criterion (6.3), we find
Vm (s|s, t) = [Cov [v (t) , t] /2f (s|t)]
Z 1
−1
xq (x) (1 + stx) / (1 + sxEt)2 dx.
When t = Et, this reduces to Vm (s|s) from the case of unknown ability, so this average
sender has precisely the same incentive to deviate as before. For any t, the sign of Vm (s|s, t)
is dictated by the integral
R 1
−1 xq (x) (1 + stx) / (1 + sxEt)
2 dx which has a derivative in t
of the same sign as s. Thus, for any s > 0, Vm (s|s, t) is increasing in t. In the special case
with prior q symmetric around state 0, we have seen in the unknown ability version of the
model that Vm (0|0) = 0 and Vm (s|s) is of opposite sign to s. We then conclude that in
this case the bias towards the expected is weaker for more able experts.
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Example 2B (continued). In the location experiment with prior information and
known ability, it can be shown (as in Proposition 5) that there is a conservative devi-
ation incentive: Vm (s|s, t) > 0 when s < µ and Vm (s|s, t) < 0 when s > µ.
6.4. Deviation from truthful revelation of posterior
Having shown that truthful reporting of the signal is impossible, we now investigate truth-
ful reporting of the posterior belief q (x|s, t)–this belief often pools different combinations
of signal s and ability t. Note that higher ability experts more often have extreme pos-
terior beliefs about the state. Intuitively, there should then be an incentive to send more
extreme messages in order to indicate ability. This intuition is verified in Examples 1A
as well as in the following two examples, where the previous bias towards the expected is
replaced by a bias away from the expected.30
Example 1C (continued). In this model, the sender’s posterior q (x|s, t) depends on
(s, t) ∈ [−1, 1] × [0, 1] only through the product st. Obviously, truthful reporting of the
posterior is impossible, because deviation to messages m ∈ {−1, 1} gives the highest
possible reputation, t = 1 for sure. Through fˆ(m|x, t) = (1 +mx) /2t for |m| ≤ t and







for t ≥ |m|, we obtain








which has the same sign as m. The deviation incentive is therefore now away from the
middle messages.
Example 2C: Normal location experiment. The normal location experiment is a
special version of the location experiment with symmetric prior, in which the prior is
x ∼ N (µ, 1/ν) and the signal is s|x, t ∼ N (x, 1/t).31
In this example, the sender’s posterior is x ∼ N ((ts+ νµ) / (t+ ν) , 1/ (t+ ν)) and
this distribution identifies the pair (s, t).32 A natural candidate strategy in the normal
30This exaggeration incentive persists in equilibrium in Prendergast and Stole’s (1996) model, where
the decision is delegated to the sender and the evaluator does not observe the state realization. This
incentive also persists in equilibrium in Zitzewitz’s (2001) model, where the evaluation of forecast quality
is performed with a realistic econometric technique.
31Notice that this Normal experiment is different from that used in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003), in
which q (x|s) rather than q (x|s, t) is Normally distributed.
32More general location experiments have often only trivial iso-posterior sets corresponding to single
ability levels, which clearly cannot be truthfully reported.
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location experiment is to report the posterior mean, m (s, t) = (ts+ νµ) / (t+ ν). We can
prove that in this setting there is again an incentive to exaggerate.
Proposition 6 (Exaggeration in normal experiment). In the normal experiment,
when the receiver conjectures truthful reporting of the posterior mean, there is an incentive
to exaggerate as Vm (m (s, t) |s, t) < 0 when m < µ and Vm (m (s, t) |s, t) > 0 when m > µ.
6.5. Equilibrium predictions
We have argued that deviation incentives may depend on whether the ability is known by
the sender. But our deviation incentives are confounded in equilibrium, as concluded in
Example 1A. We now elaborate on this point.
Example 1C (continued). Consider the multiplicative linear experiment with two
states X = {−1, 1}. We investigate the existence of equilibria in which the threshold
of indifference between a message and another are iso-posterior curves. In a binary equi-
librium with threshold value k of st, message m is sent for −1 ≤ st ≤ k and message m0
is sent for k < st ≤ 1. Unlike in the unknown ability case, in this example (as well as in
Example 1A) for any prior belief there exist informative equilibria, where experts report
whether E [x|s, t] is above or below a certain threshold value.
Proposition 7 (Informative equilibrium with known ability). In the multiplicative
linear experiment with known ability, a binary equilibrium exists for any prior q (x).
To understand this result, note that a message sent exclusively by the highest possible
type gives the highest possible reputation, regardless of the realized state of the world. No
matter how extreme is the prior belief on the state, the strongest types always have the
self-confidence required to send a message opposite to the prior. If a sufficiently small set
of good types are sending the message, they signal that they are good and secure a good
minimum reputation, even when the state of the world turns out against them.
Example 2B (continued). In the symmetric location experiment, the binary equilib-
rium reported in Section 5 also exists when the expert knows her own known ability. If
the signal is very far from µ, it is then conservative behavior to send a message that pools
with signals predominantly closer to µ. Conversely, when the signal is very close to µ, it is
an exaggeration to pool with signals mostly farther from µ. Since more able experts have
more variable posterior beliefs on the location, they are more likely to exhibit conservative
behavior in this equilibrium.
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Although we can say something meaningful about the direction of deviations in these
two examples, the only general conclusion about the equilibrium of the model is that biases
cannot be unidirectional. Consider any message m sent by the sender whenever (s, t) ∈M
where M is some subset of S × T , and focus on the implied message of E[x|M ]. This
generally differs from the expert’s own E [x|s, t], since the expert has finer information.
Now, the average of the deviations E[x|M ] − E[x|s, t] is necessarily equal to zero, since
by the law of iterated expectations we have E[x|M ] = E[E[x|s, t]|M ]. Thus a rational
receiver is not fooled in equilibrium. While some experts may be biased in one direction
when reportingM , other experts reporting the same messageM must necessarily have the
opposite bias.
Our examples suggest that the equilibria tend to select more able experts to be more
frequently biased towards the expected. This effect arises because they end up pooling
with lower ability experts, whose posterior beliefs are less variable.
7. Multiple experts and relative reputational concerns
“a decision was made at the outset of this study not to disclose the sources
of the forecasts evaluated . . . forecasters are rivals or competitors . . . Any
statement bearing on the relative quality of a forecaster’s product could be
used in this competition.” (page 1 in Zarnowitz, 1967).
Can competition between experts affect the amount of information credibly commu-
nicated? For instance, full information revelation results in equilibrium when consult-
ing simultaneously multiple perfectly informed experts in the partisan cheap-talk model
of Crawford and Sobel (1982), as shown by Krishna and Morgan (2000) and Battaglini
(2002). Consider instead multiple professional experts with conditionally independent sig-
nals. If they simultaneously report their messages and care only about their own absolute
reputation, the equilibrium is the same as in the single-expert model.
If instead the market rewards those with better reputation more if they are scarcer,
experts should care about their relative reputation. One could expect that more differen-
tiation and perhaps more information revelation would result in the presence of relative
reputational concerns. We now show that this is not the case when reputational pref-
erences have a von Neumann-Morgenstern representation and experts have conditionally
independent signals.
We consider simultaneous reporting by experts i = 1, ..., N . Expert i’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern payoff ui(ti, t−i) is assumed to depend also on the ability of all other experts
t−i ≡
¡
t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tN
¢
, with ui increasing in ti but possibly decreasing in tj for j 6=
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i. We also make the natural assumptions that the state of the world and the ability types
of the experts are independently distributed and that the experts’ signals are independent
conditionally on state and ability.
The independence assumption implies stochastic independence of posterior reputations
of different experts updated after the reports and observation of the state of the world.
Moreover, only an expert’s own message (and the state of the world) influences the up-
dating of the reputation of that expert. According to the martingale property of updated
Bayesian beliefs, the expected posterior reputations of other experts equal the prior repu-
tations. Finally, the von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff is linear in those beliefs. Thus we
have the next general result:
Proposition 8 (Irrelevance of relative reputation).Assume that the experts have von
Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs, and that their signals are independent conditionally on
state and ability. In equilibrium of the relative reputation model with unknown and known
own ability and any experiment f(s|x, t), expert i behaves as in the absolute reputation
model with increasing utility function vi(ti) = Et−i [ui(ti, t−i)].
In order to generate new and interesting results, a relative reputations model must then
either assume that there is correlation of experts’ signals conditionally on the state and
ability draw or give up the von Neumann-Morgenstern formulation. For an investigation
of relative reputational concerns in a binary model with conditionally correlated signals
see Effinger and Polborn (2001).
It is worth remarking that our von Neumann-Morgenstern formulation is rather re-
strictive in this setting with multiple experts and does not allow for the market to reward
experts on the basis of a comparison of some summary statistics of their updated reputa-
tion. For instance, the case in which the expert with highest expected ability receives all
the rewards cannot be modeled with von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs.
8. Conclusion
We conclude by briefly summarizing the answers to the five questions addressed in this
paper and by suggesting some avenues for future research.
First, when is the expert’s concern for accuracy compatible with truthful information
transmission? The main result of this paper is that truthtelling is generally not an equi-
librium when the signal and the state can be cross-checked to update beliefs about the
expert’s ability. In a putative fully revealing equilibrium, the signal and the realized state
are informative about ability, giving an incentive to the expert to manipulate the report of
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the signal in order to generate a better reputation. In contrast with the canonical model
of partisan advice, truthtelling in a professional setting is possible, but only under non
generic conditions. If there is some interval of signals that is truthfully reported in equi-
librium for an open and dense set of priors over the state and utility functions, then the
signal structure must satisfy the very special property of local uninformativeness.
Second, in which direction does the expert wish to bias the report, when believed to be
truthful? The expert gains from pretending to have a higher signal than the one actually
observed if this affects the signal likelihood ratio in the direction of higher ability. In the
examples we have seen that this often implies a bias towards the expected.
Third, what reporting strategy should the investor rationally expect the expert to use in
equilibrium? While there is always a pooling equilibrium in which the expert communicates
no information, there are often partially separating equilibria in which some information
is conveyed. The report garbles the information about the state of the world as well as
the expert’s ability. In cheap talk equilibrium, the rational receiver unravels any attempt
by the sender to bias the report uniformly in one direction.
Fourth, what is the effect of the expert’s knowledge about own ability? This introduces
an incentive to send more extreme messages in order to signal ability, but in equilibrium
more informed experts are forced to be more often biased towards the expected.
Fifth, what is the effect of competition among experts? We have shown that relative
reputational concerns make no difference to the model’s predictions if the payoff has a von
Neumann-Morgenstern specification and the signals are conditionally independent.
Finally, the stylized model studied in this paper leaves open a number of questions
for further research. While the implicit incentives provided by the market discipline the
expert’s behavior, they also increase the scope for strategic manipulation in the revelation
of a given level of information. It is natural to ask how these problems can be overcome with
optimally designed explicit incentives. A starting point for investigating the interaction
between explicit and implicit incentives is provided by Holmström and Ricart i Costa
(1986) for the case in which ability adds instead to the value of the output produced. It
would also be interesting to extend our model to allow the expert to become more informed
by acquiring costly signals. The point of departure would be Osband’s (1989) study of
explicit incentives for truthtelling and information acquisition by forecasters in the absence
of reputational concerns.
Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 1—8 follow.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We first specify the topology on the set of prior beliefs and utility
functions as the product topology of the following two topologies. On the set of probability
distributions overX, employ the weak topology (see page 40 of Parthasarathy, 1967), which
lets the net qλ of measures converge to the limit measure q if and only if
R
vdqλ converges toR
vdq for all bounded real-valued continuous functions v. On the set of weakly increasing
continuous functions on T , employ the topology of uniform convergence.
The set in which truthtelling holds on B is defined by the collection of weak inequalities
V (s|s) ≥ V (m|s) for all m, s ∈ B. By continuity of the integrals w.r.t. the prior belief
q (x) and utility function v (t), this set is closed, being the intersection of closed sets. Its
open complement is the set of q, v for which local truthtelling in B is impossible.
This open set is also dense, since from any pair q, v it is possible to find another pair
q0, v0 arbitrarily close to q, v such that local truthtelling fails. This is shown analytically


















v(t)pm(t|s, x) dtf (s|x)f (s) q(x) dx.
If truthtelling holds for all s ∈ B under local perturbations in q, then for almost all x ∈ X,
0 =
R
T v(t)pm(t|s, x) dtf (s|x). Lemma 1 (stated and proven below) guarantees that, unless
pm(t|s, x) = 0 for all t, there exists a weakly increasing, continuous d : T → R such thatR
T d (t) pm(t|s, x) dt 6= 0. Reversing this logic, if truthtelling is to be robust against the
local perturbations v+ εd for ε > 0 to v, then for almost all s ∈ B, almost all x ∈ X, and




(∂f (s|x, t) /∂sj) f (s|x)− (∂f (s|x) /∂sj) f (s|x, t)
(f (s|x))2
So 0 = pm(t|s, x) implies for almost all s ∈ B, almost all x ∈ X, and almost all t ∈ T , and
all j = 1, . . . , J :
(∂f (s|x, t) /∂sj)
f (s|x, t) =
(∂f (s|x) /∂sj)
f (s|x) .
This condition states that the ratios (∂f (s|x, t) /∂sj) /f (s|x, t) do not depend on t. The
ratio (∂f (s|x, t) /∂sj) /f (s|x, t) is equal to d log (f (s|x, t)) /dsj, so through integration
the ratios determine log (f (s|x, t)) up to an additive constant. Thus we can conclude that
there exist functionsK (t) and g (s|x) such that for almost all s ∈ B, almost all x ∈ X, and
almost all t ∈ T we have f (s|x, t) = K (t) g (s|x). The signal is then locally uninformative,
in violation of the assumption. Q.E.D.
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Lemma 1. Consider any continuous function g : T → R. Either g (t) = 0 for almost all t,
or there exists a weakly increasing, continuous d : T → R such that
R
T g (t) d (t) dt 6= 0.
Proof. Unless g = 0 almost everywhere, there exists some ε > 0 and t ∈ T such that
|g (t0)| > |g (t)| /2 for all t0 ∈ (t− ε, t+ ε). Let two weakly increasing, continuous functions
d1, d2 : T → R be defined as follows. Let d1 (t0) = 0 when t0 ≤ t−ε, d1 (t0) = t0−t+ε when
t0 ∈ (t− ε, t) , and d1 (t0) = ε when t0 ≥ t. Likewise, let d2 (t0) = 0when t0 ≤ t, d2 (t0) = t0−t
when t0 ∈ (t, t+ ε) , and d2 (t0) = ε when t0 ≥ t+ε. Also, define d3 = d1−d2. It is simple to
verify that d3 is continuous, zero outside (t− ε, t+ ε), strictly positive inside (t− ε, t+ ε),
and that
R
T g (t) d3 (t) dt 6= 0. Since
R
T g (t) d3 (t) dt =
R
T g (t) d1 (t) dt +
R
T g (t) d2 (t) dt,
it follows that
R
T g (t) d1 (t) dt 6= 0 or
R
T g (t) d2 (t) dt 6= 0, as desired. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is seen immediately that f(s|x) = (Et)δx(s) + (1−Et)h(s) and
f(s) = (Et)q(s) + (1−Et)h(s). Assuming truthtelling, the posterior reputation is
p(t|m,x) = f(m|x, t)
f(m|x) p(t) =
½
tp(t)/Et if x = m
(1− t)p(t)/(1−Et) if x 6= m
The reputation obtained after the realization x = m dominates in the first-order stochastic





(Et)q(s) + (1− Et)h(s)δx(s) +
(1−Et)h(s)
(Et)q(s) + (1−Et)h(s)q(x),
an average between an atom at x = s and the continuous prior q(x).
By sending m = s there is a positive probability that x = m and the reputation will
be favorably updated. If instead m 6= s there is probability zero that x = m, so that
the updating which results is necessarily unfavorable. The sender prefers the chance of a
favorable updating and so truthfully reports m = s. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since the receiver anticipates truthtelling, the posterior reputation
is
p (t|m,x) = p (t) f (m|x, t)
f (m|x) =
p (t) g (|m− x| |t)
g (|m− x|) .
We see that p (t|m,x) depends only on |m− x|. By the MLRP, the smaller is |m− x| the
better news for t, i.e. p (t|m,x) is better in the first-order stochastic dominance sense. For
any increasing v we conclude that W (m|x) ≡ RT v(t)p(t|m,x) dt depends only on |m− x|,
and is a decreasing function of |m− x| ∈ [0, π].
Since q (x) is the uniform distribution, the sender’s posterior belief on x is described
by the p.d.f. q(x|s) = f (s|x) /f (s). By symmetry and unimodality of f (s|x), this distri-
bution of x is symmetric and unimodal around s. Thus, q(x|s) depends only on |x − s|
and is decreasing in |x− s| ∈ [0, π].
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We now show that these properties ofW and q imply that m = s maximizes V (m|s) =R
X W (m|x)q(x|s) dx over m, so that truthtelling is optimal. By symmetry, it suffices to
consider m ∈ [s, s+ π] and prove that V (s|s) ≥ V (m|s). Note that half of the space X is
closer to s than to m, namely the values of x in the interval [(s+m− 2π) /2, (s+m) /2].
We have
V (s|s)− V (m|s) =
Z (s+m)/2
(s+m−2π)/2
















[W (s|x)−W (m|x)] [q (x|s)− q (x|m)] dx
where the first equality is by definition, the second uses the change of variable y = m+s−x
in the second integral, and the last follows from W and q depending on their arguments
only through their distance. Since [(s+m− 2π) /2, (s+m) /2] has x values closer to s
than m, we have W (s|x) ≥ W (m|x) and q(x|s) ≥ q (x|m). Then the integrand is always
non-negative and so the integral is non-negative, proving V (s|s)−V (m|s) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Expanding the derivative of V (m|s) with respect to coordinate















f (s|x, t) p (t)
f (s|x) dt










p (t|s, x) q (x, t|s) dt dx,
where q (x, t|s) denotes the posterior belief on (x, t), identical to f (s|x, t) p (t) q (x) /f (s)
by Bayes’ rule. Since E
£
pmj (t|s, x) /p (t|s, x) |s
¤
= 0 for all s, we can write Vmj (s|s) =
Cov
¡
v (t) , pmj (t|s, x) /p (t|s, x) |s
¢
. Finally, from p (t|s, x) = f (s|x, t) p (t) /f (s|x) we ob-
tain
pmj (t|s, x)
p (t|s, x) =
fmj (s|t, x)
f (s|t, x) −
fmj (s|x)
f (s|x) . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 5. As in the proof of Proposition 3, W (m|x) is a decreasing func-
tion of |m − x| ∈ R+. The sender’s posterior belief is q(x|s) = f (s|x) q (x) /f (s) =
g (|s− x|)h (|x− µ|) /f (s). Now,















Wm(s|x)g (|s− x|) [h (|x− µ|)− h (|2s− x− µ|)] dx,
where the last equality used the change of variable y = 2s−x with the symmetry properties
Wm(s|x) = −Wm(s|2s − x) and g (|s− x|) = g (|s− (2s− x)|). For any x > s we have
Wm(s|x) < 0, since W is decreasing in the distance of its arguments. Now, suppose s < µ,
then 2s − µ < s, so every x > s satisfies |x− µ| < |2s− x− µ|. Since h is decreasing,
it follows that the integrand is positive for almost all x, and so the integral is positive.
Symmetrically, when s > µ the integral is negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. The message m is a linear transformation of s, so that m|x, t ∼
N
¡
m (x, t) , t/ (t+ ν)2
¢
with density












When the receiver observes (m,x), the inference on t is therefore a function of (m− x)2
and (m− µ)2. In particular, fˆ satisfies the MLRP, so that a partial increase in (m− x)2 is
worse news about t, while a partial increase in (m− µ)2 is better news about t. It follows
that W (m|x) can be written as a function Wˆ (|m− x| , |m− µ|), with a negative partial
derivative in its first argument, and a positive partial derivative in its second argument.
Since V (m|s, t) = RX Wˆ (|m− x| , |m− µ|) q (x|s, t) dx, we have
Vm (m|s, t) =
Z
X




Wˆ2 (|m− x| , |m− µ|) q (x|s, t) dx,
where sgn (z) denotes the sign of z, i.e. 1 when z > 0 and −1 when z < 0. Notice that
Wˆ1 (|m− x| , |m− µ|) sgn (m− x) is an odd function of x around m. Since the normal
posterior q (x|s, t) is symmetric around m (s, t), we can conclude that the first integral
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vanishes. On the other hand, Wˆ2 > 0, so the second line is proportional to sgn (m− µ).
This is positive if m > µ, negative if m < µ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. We establish this result through two Lemmata. Lemma 2 shows
with a simple fixed-point argument that there exists some interior iso-posterior curve with
indifference V (m|s, t) = V (m0|s, t) among the messages above and below the same curve.
Lemma 3 shows for incentive compatibility, that V (m|s, t)−V (m0|s, t) is monotonic across
iso-posterior curves. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. There exists a k ∈ (−1, 1) such that V (m|s, t = k/s) = V (m0|s, t = k/s) when
m is sent by st ≤ k types and m0 is sent by the others.
Proof. First, we argue that for k sufficiently close to 1, message m0 is better than m. As
k → 1, the set m0 of (s, t) satisfying st ≥ k shrinks towards the corner (s, t) = (1, 1).
Since v is strictly increasing and p (t) is non-degenerate, there exists some t∗ ∈ (0, 1) with
v(t∗) > Ev(t). When k > t∗, message m0 is sent only by types who know t > t∗, so that
V (m0|s, t) > v(t∗). On the other hand, as k tends to 1, m tends towards an uninformative
message, so V (m|s, t)→ Ev(t). In conclusion, for large k, V (m|s, t) < v(t∗) < V (m0|s, t).
This is true for all pairs (s, t), and in particular for all those with st = k.
By analogy, when k is sufficiently close to −1, senders with st = k prefers message m
over m0. When k changes, we continuously change V (m|s, t = k/s) and V (m0|s, t = k/s).
We know that V (m|s, t = k/s)− V (m0|s, t = k/s) is positive for k near −1 and negative
for k near +1. There must be an intermediate equilibrating k. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. If the receiver believes that m is sent by the st ≤ k types and that m0 is sent
by the others, then V (m0|s, t = l/s)− V (m|s, t = l/s) is increasing in l.















−1 ds = 2 for 0 ≤ t ≤ k and I1(t) = 1 + k/t for k ≤ t ≤ 1 and, similarly,
I2(t) =
R k/t
−1 s ds = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ k and I2(t) = (k
2/t2 − 1)/2 for k ≤ t ≤ 1. We have
fˆ(m|x) = R 1
0
fˆ(m|x, t)p(t) dt = (E [I1(t)] +E [I2(t)t]x) /2, so that
p(t|m,x) = I1(t) + I2(t)tx
E [I1(t)] +E [I2(t)t]x
p(t)
and
P (t|m,x) = E [I1(t) | t
0 ≤ t] +E [I2(t)t | t0 ≤ t]x
E [I1(t)] +E [I2(t)t]x
P (t). (A.1)
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Since I2 is non-positive and decreasing in t, we have 0 ≥ E [I2(t)t | t0 ≤ t] ≥ E [I2(t)t].
Similarly, I1(t) is positive and decreasing in t so that E [I1(t) | t0 ≤ t] ≥ E [I1(t)] ≥ 0.
According to (A.1), P (t|m,x) is then increasing in x. An analogous argument shows
that P (t|m,x) is again increasing in x when k < 0. Finally, since v(t) is increasing in
t, W (m|x) = RT v(t)p(t|m0, x) dt is decreasing in x. From (6.1), an increase in l yields
a first-order stochastic dominance increase in q(x|s, t = l/s), so that in turn V (m|s, t =
l/s) =
R
X W (m|x)q(x|s, t = l/s) dx decreases in l.
Similar calculations show P (t|m0, x) decreasing in x and V (m0|s, t = l/s) increasing in
l. We conclude that V (m0|s, t = l/s)− V (m|s, t = l/s) is increasing in l. Q.E.D.

















ui(ti, t−i)p(t−i|m,x) dt−ip(ti|m,x) dtifˆ ¡m−i|x¢ dm−i.
By the assumption of independence of the ability of different experts, posterior reputations
are again stochastically independent. In particular, the posterior reputation of an expert is
stochastically independent of the message reported by another expert, p(t−i|mi,m−i, x) =





























p(t−i|m−i, x)fˆ ¡m−i|x¢ dm−i dt−i.
The law of iterated expectations givesZ
M−i
p(t−i|m−i, x)fˆ ¡m−i|x¢ dm−i = p(t−i|x) = p(t−i),









and thus vi (ti, x) does not depend on x. Furthermore, since ui is increasing in ti for any
t−i, we find that vi(ti) is an increasing function of ti. We are thus back to the origi-
nal problem with absolute reputational concerns, with the individual objective function
vi(ti) = Et−iui(ti, t−i).
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When expert i knows her own type, equation (A.2) becomes





mi|x¢ q(x|si, ti) dx
and the rest of the proof goes through as before. Q.E.D.
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